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THE LOGAN BILL
By GREGORY HAxKm*
In the last session of Congress, Senator Logan of Kentucky
introduced a bill' to establish a United States Court of Appeals
for Administration,2 to which would be transferred the jurisdiction now exercised by the federal district courts and the Circuit
Court of Appeals in reviewing certain enumerated classes of administrative orders.3
*B. S., M. A., LL. M. Member of the District of Columbia Bar and
of the Maryland Bar; Sometime Brownfield Memorial Fellow in Ethics
and Jurisprudence at Harvard; Director of Legal Research Service
1927-1938; Editor and Publisher of United States Supreme Court
Service 1928-1937; author of books on the work of the Supreme Court
and of numerous articles in legal and other publications.
S. 3676, 75th Congress, 3rd Sess.
Sec. 1 of the bill reads as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby created a United States Court of
Appeals for Administration (hereinafter referred to as the court),
organized and constituted as follows:
(a) The court shall be composed of a chief justice and
ten associate justices who shall be selected solely with regard
only to their qualifications and fitness to perform the special
duties of the court.
(b) The chief justice and the associate justices shall be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. They shall hold office during good behavior
and may be retired as provided in section 714 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended.
(c) The chief justice and each associate justice shall
receive a salary of $12,500 per year payable monthly out of the
Treasury 6f the United States.
3Subsection (d) of See. 4 enumerates the types of orders and
decisions within the jurisdiction of the proposed court as follows:
(d) The jurisdiction of the court shall, extend to the following orders and decisions:
(1) Decisions of the United States Board of Tax Appeals
(26 U. S. C. 641).
(2) Decisions of the Processing Tax Board of Review in
the Treasury Department in respect to the Processing tax
(7 U. S. C. 648).
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The establishment of new courts to adjudicate specialized
controversies is not new in legal history. There have been
(3) Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
except orders for the payment of money, as follows:
(A) Orders under the Interstate Commerce Act (28
U. S. 0. 43-48; 49 U. S. C. 16 (12)).
(B) Cease and desist orders under the Clayton Act
(15 U. S. C. 21).
(C) Cease and desist orders under the Motor Vehicle
Act.
(D) Orders issued under the authority of the Motor
Carriers Act (49 U. S. C. 305 (h); 36 Stat. 1148-1149; 38
Stat. 219; 28 U. S. C. 43-48).
(E) Negative orders under Motor Carriers Act issued
solely because of a supposed lack of power (49 U. S. C.
305 (h); 28 U. S. C. 43).
(4) The following orders of the Federal Communications
Commission:
(A) General Orders of the Commission (47 U. S. C.
Supp. III 1935-37, 402 (a)), except orders for the payment
of money.
(B) Cease and desist orders under the Clayton Act
(15 U. S. C. 21).
(C) Orders and decisions in respect to construction
permit, radio-station license and renewal, and modification
and suspension of license (47 U. S. C. Hupp. III, 1985-7,
402 (b)).
(D) Decisions iI, respect to radio requirements,
installations, or exemptions from prescribed radio requirements on board ship (47 U. S. C. 361).
(5) Orders and decisions of the Commodities Exchange
Commission(A) In refusal to designate a board of trade as a contract market (7 U. S. C. 8, 10).
(B) In re suspension or revocation of the designation
of a board of trade as a contract market (7 U. S. C. 8. 10)
(6) Orders of the Federal Power Commission in respect
to the regulation of electric companies engaged in interstate
commerce (49 Stat. 860-861, 16 U. H. C. 825 1).
(7) Orders of the Federal Trade Commission:
(A) Cease and desist orders under the Clayton Act
(15 U. S. C. 21).
(B) Cease and desist orders under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U. S. C. 45, Pub. No. 447, 75th Cong.
3rd Hess. 15 U. S. C. 65).
(8) Orders of the National Bituminous Coal Commission
under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (See. 6(b), 50 Stat. 85).
(9) Orders of the National Labor Relations Board: Cease
and
desist orders from unfair labor practices (29 U. S. C.
160 ( f ) (i) ).
(10) Orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission(A) In respect to the issue of securities (15 U. S. C.
77(i)).
(B) In respect to security exchanges (15 U. S. C.
78(y)).
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numerous examples of special courts established to cope with new
problems, or problems which required a different treatment from
the great mass of cases coming to the courts of general jurisdic(C) Under Public Utilities Holding Company Act of
1935 (15 U. S. C. 79(x)).
(11) Orders of the United States Maritime Commission:
Orders of the Commission under Shipping Act of 1916 (39 Stat.
737) and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (46 U. S. C. 1114),
except orders for the payment of money.
(12) Orders of the Secretary of Agriculture as follows:
(A) Cease and desist orders under the Packers and
Stockyards Act (7 U. S. C. 194).
(B) Orders issued as Chairman of the Commodities
Exchange Commission suspending or revoking the privilege
of trading in a contract market (7 U. S. C. 9).
(C) Cease and desist orders to prevent monopolizing
or restraining trade and unduly enhancing prices of associations of producers of agricultural products (7 U. S. C.
292).
(D) Orders as to rates, practices and discrimination
in respect to stockyards. (7 U. S. 0. 217; 28 U. S. C.
48-44, 45a, 47, 48).
(E) Orders under the Perishable Commodities Act. (7
U. S. C. J99k; 28 U. S. C. 43-48).
(13) Cease and desist orders of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System in respect to interlocking directorates and officers (15 U. S. C. 19, 21).
(14) Cease and desist orders of the Secretary of Commerce in respect to monopolization or restraint of trade in the
fishing industry (15 U. S. C. 522).
(15) Orders of the Post Office Department requiring publications to be sent by freight (39 U. S. C. 576).
(16) Orders of the Federal Alcohol Administration in the
Treasury Department: (a) In re denying application for or
the revocation, suspension, or annulment of a basic permit
(27 U. S. C. 204 (h)). (b) Orders in re interlocking directorates, (27 U. S. C. 208).
(N. B.--Italies indicate corrections or amendments suggested during the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This applies also
to sections quoted in subsequent footnotes.)
In addition to the above, it is expected, the jurisdiction of the proposed court will extend to orders of the Federal Power Commission
under the review provisions of the Natural Gas Act, Public No. 688, 75th
Cong. 3rd Sess., and to orders of the Civil Aeronautics Authority under
the review provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act, Public No. 706, 75th
Cong. 3rd Sess. Both statutes were enacted after the Logan Bill had
been introduced. The object of Sec. 4 is to transfer to the proposed
Court's jurisdiction, those orders which are now subject to statutory
review by proceedings in the nature of appeal from administrative
agencies, whether by direct petition to an appellate court or by a proceeding de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. The bill, however,
does not contemplate disturbing the jurisdiction of such appellate
review as Is now exercised by the Court of Customs Appeals, nor the
primary jurisdiction of the Customs Court nor of the district courts
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. 901. In view of the many exceptions, the
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tion. In some instances, the new tribunals served their purpose,
the special problems disappeared, and the courts were abolished.
At other times, the new problems became crystalized into definite
rules of law which could be as easily administered by the courts
of general jurisdiction, with which the special courts became consolidated. 4 A number of special courts have justified their existdraftsmen of the bill had to resort to the method of enumerating the
agencies and orders to be reviewed rather than include them in a generalized statement of jurisdiction.
Subsection (c) of Sec. 4 transfers jurisdiction to the proposed
court in the following language:
The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review on appeal all
final orders and decisions of the following administrative authorities
and tribunals which are now subject to review by the Federal courts
as indicated in section (d) of this Act and such other jurisdiction as
Congress may from time to time confer upon it. All such jurisdiction
now vested in the United States circuit courts of appeals, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the United States
district courts, and the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia is hereby abolished as to all such orders and decisions becoming final one hundred and eighty days after the effective date of the
passage of this Act.
'See Holdsworth: History of English Law, Vol. I. It Is
within the process of history for courts to come and go. From the
earliest days of English history to the present, new courts with new
judicial procedures have sprung into being, to take care of the constant
growth and changes in the social order. The great majority of these
courts trace their origin to the middle ages and have their roots deep
in antiquity. A casual look at their names will recall officials and
tribunals which have survived during the ages, while others have been
absorbed into the great body of the law and their indentity lost in
newer institutions.
Before judicial institutions became centralized into one coordinated
system, justice in England, like other functions of the government, was
administered by local courts. Holdsworth tells us of a great variety of
these local tribunals, of which the earliest, perhaps, were the communal courts. These consisted of the sheriff's courts and the coroner's
court. The sheriff's court dates back to the 12th century, and as the
name implies, revolves around the office and duties of the county sheriff.
He was one of the most powerful officials of the time, being at once in
control of the king's revenue, police, military force, etc., and he had
the power of arrest. He also executed the writs of the court, a function
which still survives. In addition to presiding over his court, he also held
the hundred court (derived from a geographical area) and the county
court (not to be confused with the modern 19th century county court),
which at that time was a small Parliament exercising legislative, executive and judicial functions for the community. As the powers of the
sheriff were taken from him, his court began to decline, and at the end
of the 13th century, the judicial powers of the local courts were
gradually assumed by the itinerant justices and the common law courts.
The county and hundred courts, exercising a civil jurisdiction, ceased
to exist as courts for litigation. The criminal jurisdiction was exercised by the Sheriff's Tourn, an institution fixed by the Magna Carta,
which was a distinct court. The statute of 1461 marked its decline,
and practically abolished it, jurisdiction having been taken over by the
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ence as separate tribunals, and have become a permanent part of
justices of the peace. By the beginning of the 17th century it was
obsolete, and was totally abolished by the Sheriff's Act of 1887.
The coroner's court, the second old communal court dating.back
to the year 1194, was centered around the functions of the coroner,
an official established to check the growing power of the sheriffs. The
coroner acted in certain cases for the sheriff, was in charge of the
administration of criminal laws, such as arresting offenders, etc., but
his chief duty, which still survives, was to impanel a jury and hold a
court in cases of unexplained death. The Act of 1885 abolished his
jurisdiction in criminal cases.
The second important group of local courts, established to meet
specialized needs, were the private or franchise courts, which came
about from the fact that the authority of the state was divided among
those who received the rights or franchise in the soil of the state.
These great franchise interests were permitted to have their own courts
to adjudicate their special problems. Holdsworth divides the franchises into five principal classes: (1) The royal forests; (2) the landowners; (3) the Boroughs; (4) The Stannaries and (5) the Universities. Each of these powerful franchise holders had their own laws,
customs, and courts, which for centuries controlled their jurisdictions,
outside the common law, and the common law courts.
There was great rivalry, however, between the two judicial systems,
and the franchise courts were gradually abolished and assimilated with
the common law tribunals. Beginning with 1565 the common law
courts began to take jurisdiction of cases involving the forest laws.
With the abolition of the forest laws, the special courts decayed and
became obsolete.
The landowners' courts were established in conjunction with the
great palatinates, those independent principalities like Durham, Lancaster, Chester and Wales, where the law of England did not apply.
Some of these independent tribunals were abolished with the abolition
of the palatinates, while others were reorganized and regulated under
the Common Law Procedure Acts, or were merged with the High
Courts of Justice, under the Judicature Act of 1873. Some were
abolished when they attempted to interfere with the mighty arm of the
Star Chamber tribunal. In Wales, the English and Welsh systems
were assimilated giving to the "Welshman a system of local courts,
and probably a cheaper justice than would be had at Westminister."
Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 132.
The Borough Courts date from the 13th century and owe their
origin to a right in the borough charter to hold a court. These courts
were sometimes held by the lord of the manor, and like the ancient
county courts, were governing bodies, exercising all functions of government. They, too, disappeared with the growing powers of the justices
of the peace and the popularity of the common law courts, which had
constantly hampered their jurisdiction by the issuance of the prerogative writs. By 1800, the Borough Courts had practically disappeared,
although the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 provided for a scheme
of reform of some borough courts, which had the right to hold quarter
sessions.
The courts of the Stannaries were maintained by the mining
interests, who had received franchises from earliest times. Here, too,
difficulties arose as to conflict of jurisdiction with the general common
law courts, and in 1836, a statute was passed consolidating some of
these special courts and allowing appeals to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The court of appeals for
the Stannaries, which was called the Court of the Lord Warden, was
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merged with the Court of Appeals of England under the Judicature
Act and the Court of the Vice Warden was abolished in 1896 and its
duties conferred upon the newly created county courts.
The last of the franchise courts dealt with the privileges accorded
the professions, especially the universities. The courts of the universities date to 1244, and they had jurisdiction over all persons and property affecting the universities. The procedure in use was both canon
and secular. During the 19th century, these special courts gradually
lost their jurisdiction. At first, they were deprived of cases involving
morals of laymen; and in 1858 they lost jurisdiction over testamentary
matters, while in 1879 they were deprived of jurisdiction in criminal
cases. Today they are obsolete.
The feudal and manorial courts are the third great group of courts,
which have come and gone with the great social changes in society.
These, of course, were the appendages of the landowning classes. Like
most of the local courts of their time, they performed both administrative and judicial functions, and were like the communal courts, already
referred to. Their obsolete procedure, likewise, contributed to their
decadence in the 18th century, and their duties also passed to the courts
of common law.
There are other examples of special courts in English history,
established for specific needs, which were finally abandoned or merged
into the general judicial system, when they no longer served the purpose for which they were created. The Court of the Exchequer had a
long history dating from the end of the 13th Century. It was limited to
revenue cases, but it had both common law and equity jurisdiction. The
latter was transferred to the Court of Chancery in 1842, and was finally
merged with the High Court of Justice under the Judicature Act of
1873.
Another special court well known to American students of English
history was the Court of the Star Chamber, which was established in
1487, primarily to deal with the chaotic conditions of the times, and
as a means of restoring law and order. It had extraordinary powers
in political criminal cases, and its tyrannical proceedings in these cases
made it odious. During the period of its rise, similar courts flourished
throughout the country, such as the Court of Requests, which supplemented and assisted the Star Chamber. After Parliament won in its
struggle with the King, both courts were abolished in 1641. The equity
jurisdiction of the Court of Requests was transferred to the Court of
Chancery; and it was enacted that no court like the Star Chamber
should ever be reestablished.
There were also a host of courts dealing with the specialized problem of the law merchant, a system of jurisprudence different and apart
from the common law. The earliest of these were the Maritime Courts,
dating back to the Middle Ages. They were local tribunals, usually
situated in the seaport towns, which adjudicated and administered all
questions of a maritime nature, including controversies growing out of
actions for and against foreigners. The common law courts were in no
position to supervise foreigners and they had no jurisdiction over contracts or torts performed abroad. The jurisdiction of these courts was
gradually assumed by the Courts of Admiralty in the 16th century, into
which they were eventually absorbed.
The commercial courts also administered the law merchant. Among
these were the Courts of the Fairs and Boroughs (the famous Piepowder Courts) dating to the 15th century, which dealt chiefly with the
laws of domestic trade. An act of 1477 restricted their jurisdiction.
Litigants began to transfer their cases to the common law courts, and
these courts, too, became absorbed in the common law system. Just
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our judicial system, 5 as, for example, the Court of Claims and
the Customs Court. The Court of Claims, created in 1855,6 for
the purpose of adjudicating claims against the United States arisas the Piepowder Courts dealt with domestic trade, so the Court of the
Staple concerned itself with laws of foreign trade. This court owes its
origin to the Staple Towns organized for the purpose of promoting
foreign trade. Eventually, they too were absorbed by the courts of
admiralty.
The last great type of special tribunals were the ecclesiastical
courts, which administered the ecclesiastical laws. These grew in
power with the rising power of the Church, and had jurisdiction not
only in such strictly ecclesiastical matters as heresy, schism, nonconformity, etc., but in all cases of matrimony, divorce, testamentary
problems and even of the censorship of the Press. Their decrees were
enforced by the extraordinary writ of excommunication. The highest
court, that of the Court of the High Commission, attained a position
like that of the Star Chamber, which it closely resembled, and it too,
was abolished in 1641. Statutes since then have further diminished
the power of these courts, and by 1813, enforcement through excommunication was abolished. Jurisdiction in probate and divorce has
been transferred to a division of the High Court of Justice under the
Judicature Act, and today it is limited to strictly ecclesiastical
problems.
In closing, we might also mention a court which served its purpose
and was abolished, that of the Court of the Constable and the Marshal.
These courts dealt with the discipline of the army and cases of slander
against the nobility, punishment for which was very severe. The
courts also had charge of prisoners of war. They fell into desuetude
in 1689, with the establishment of the courts martial, and because of
the severity of their decrees, their jurisdiction in slander cases was
taken away from them by the Long Parliament.
' No one, I suppose, will say that juvenile courts, which are comparatively new in our history, were improvidently established or that they
should be consolidated with the old courts. There is a separate and
distinct problem with which these courts must deal. Unlike the
criminal courts, whose main task is to enforce the law by punishing
offenders, the object of the juvenile courts is to correct the tendencies
of youthful offenders and develop them into law abiding citizens.
So rapid has been the rise of the juvenile court idea, that by 1928,
only two states, Wyoming and Maine, did not provide for these special
childrens' courts, but even here, provision has been made to hear cases
Involving juveniles, separately from other cases. To a lesser degree,
the movement for the establishment of domestic relations or family
courts is rapidly spreading. Here also the problems are not the same
as those of the general courts of equity. The equitable distribution of
property may be only a minor question in the dissolution of the family,
where the domestic relations court judge must concern himself with
human relations, either apart from or interwoven with questions of

property rights. There is a movement, however, to consolidate the
childrens' courts and the domestic relations court into one family court,
with separate divisions for cases concerning children. Such is the
Family Court Act for the City of New York, enacted October 1, 1933.
See also W. F. Willoughby: Principles of Judicial Administration
(1929) Ch. 24; and the report of the Children's Bureau, No. 193 (1937)
Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
OR. S. 1049, 28 U. S. C. 241.
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ing under contract and under the Federal Constitution and
statutes, has now functioned for over eighty years, and there is
no suggestion that it be abolished and its work consolidated with
the courts of general jurisdiction. Obviously, suits against the
Government are essentially different from private conflicts, and
should be treated by a court specialized in such problems. The
Customs Court, established in 19227 to deal with the applications
of the Tariff Laws, is an even more striking example. The judges
there have become so specialized and expert in their peculiar
problems, that in one year, 1936, they were able to dispose of
some 71,492 cases.8 It is important to remember that this efficiency is to a large extent the result of expertness obtained
through the handling of similarly related problems.
We are now in the midst of an era of increasing federal governmental activity in the economic life of the nation. With the
expansion of this activity, a great increase in administrative
problems and a host of difficulties pertaining to the duties and
powers of governmental officers must inevitably follow. The
common law procedure of the courts of general jurisdiction is
not always adaptable to controversies between private persons
and the agencies of government. New procedure must be
144 Stat. 669, 19 U. S. C. 405a, changing the name of the "Board of
General Appraisers" established by the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 972,
19 U.8 S. C. 405.
Report of the Attorney General, 1936, pp. 117, 157. During this
year, the district courts disposed of 141,167 cases. This makes an
average of approximately 910 cases for each district judge per year,
there having been 155 district judges, as compared with~an average of
approximately 8,000 cases for each judge of the Customs Court. This
is no reflection on the efficiency of our district judges. The cases In
the district courts are more complicated than those in the Customs
Court. The difference is attributable, to a large extent, to the fact that
the Customs Court deals with a specialized problem and adapts its
procedure in such a systematic manner that by far less time and
effort are required for the disposition of the issues involved.
The efficiency of the Court of Claims, resulting from this specialization can best be compared with the work of the Circuit Court of Appeals
and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Though
the Court of Claims is one of original jurisdiction and consists of five
judges who act as a single court, for all practical purposes, it is really
acting in an apppellate capacity, because the testimony is taken before
commissioners. During the fiscal year, 1936, the total number of cases
disposed of by the Circuit Court of Appeals and the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was 3,526. Some of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals have more than three judges, but they sit In panels
of three. The average number of cases disposed of by each panel during that year was 235. On the other hand, the Court of Claims specializing in suits against the United States, disposed of 473, or twice as
many cases during the same year
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evolved, and the law pertaining to the limits of governmental
action should be unified and systematized by judges with expert
and special knowledge of the problems of public law. This is the
raisan d'etre of the Logan Bill.
Even with this important purpose, there is no need of
establishing a new tribunal, if the present methods of judicial
review are satisfactory. It therefore becomes necessary to
examine the present situation in judicial review and enforcement
of administrative action.
I.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

The present methods of judicial review may be roughly
grouped into two types: (A) review without statutory provision,
and (B) review authorized and prescribed by statute.
(A)

Review Without Statutory Provision

Without statutory provision for judicial review of administrative action, the validity of administrative orders and decisions
is subject to review mainly in proceedings for civil or criminal
enforcement.9 If a person fails or refuses to obey a law or regulation, he may be enjoined or subjected to prosecution, or, if he
fails to pay a tax, proceedings may be instituted against him or
his property to enforce the liability. In these proceedings, all
defenses, as to the validity of the law or regulation, are available
to him. If the law or regulation is held valid, however, he is
subjected to the requirements and penalties of the law. The person challenging governmental authority has to take a chance and
pay heavily, if he guesses wrong.
If a person is injured through unauthorized governmental
action, he has a common law remedy against the officer in his
personal capacity. This remedy, however, has always been beset
with difficulties. From earliest times, the courts have wrought
an exception in favor of judicial officers,' ° which has been
extended to protect many other officers, acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity."
' For other methods of judicial review over administrative action
at common law, see Dickinson, John: Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of Law (1927) Ch. 3, p. 39 et. seq.
"Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke Rep. 23, 25. Mastyn v. Fabriggs (1774),
Cooper, 161, 172. See also In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888).
"Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. S. 503 (1927). See also Dickinson, op.
cit., pp. 44 et. seq.

K. L. J.-2
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It has long been felt that if a private person is accorded the
right to question the validity of governmental action, he should
have a remedy by way of ascertaining that validity before the
requirements or penalties of the law are applied to him. This
is the logical reason for suits against government officers to
enjoin the enforcement of statutes and administrative orders
until their validity has been judicially determined. The interference of equity courts in such cases, however, has also been
beset with difficulties. Ordinary equity procedure does not
permit wholesale interference with the operation of law. A court
12
of equity should not enjoin the enforcement of criminal statutes,
3
and, aside from statutory limitations,' equity should not enjoin
the collection of a tax, if there is an adequate remedy at law, by
paying the tax and bringing action to recover it.14
These self-imposed limitations of equity courts are only
minor difficulties. There are two fundamental difficulties. Suits
to enjoin governmental action come in conflict with the fundamental constitutional principle of the separation of powers. Our
Constitution postulates the division of government into three
parts, each supreme within its sphere. 15 Therefore the judiciary
should not undertake to pass on the validity of the governmental
action of the other branches. This obstacle to. equity suits against
government officers has been removed to some extent by the interpretation of the judicial power as extending to the determination
whether any governmental action is in accord with the dictates
of the higher law.' 6
The second fundamental difficulty is that suits to enjoin
governmental action are in conflict with the common law rule
against the suability of the sovereign without express consent. 17
Since the sovereign acts through agencies of government, im"The leading case is In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210, (1888), and
see cases cited therein.
" E. g. Sec. 3224 R. S., 26 U. S. C. 1543.
21Stratton v. St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 530 (1932),
and Matthews, et al. v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932).
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923).
"Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 24, 27
(1936); Butler v. United States, 297 U. S. 1, 62 (1936).
", See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934),
and cases cited therein, for a discussion of the doctrine of the nonsuability of sovereigns and for English and American authorities on
the subject.
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munity from suit attaches also to its agencies.' 8 To circumvent
the rule, it became necessary to resort to legal fictions, in order
to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
The plaintiff must allege that the suit is brought against the
officer, not in his representative, but in his individual capacity,
and that acting under the color of his office, but without authority
of law, he is threatening or attempting to inflict irreparable harm
upon the plaintiff.19 Upon pleading these magic words, the
distinction between a suit against an individual and one against
the government thus vanishes, and the court proceeds to pass on
and determine the validity of the action of another branch of the
government. If the defendant denies the allegation of threat,20
or the immediacy of governmental action, 2 ' or the allegation of
irreparable injury,2 2 such defenses are regarded with disfavor.
The main concern of the court is the validity of the governmental
23
action.
The Logan Bill is not concerned with review of governmental
action resulting from suits brought without express statutory
authority.2 4 It does not affect suits against officers for a redress
1See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349 (1907), for the
theory that a sovereign is exempt from suit, and the doctrine is not
confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical
theory, but is extended to those which in actual administration originate and change at their will the law of contract and property from
which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights.
1Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 157, 158 (1908).
' Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 9 F. Supp. 825, 830 (1935); also compare Ex Parte La Prade, 289 U. S. 444, 458 (1933).
1James M. Landis, Chairman, etc. v. North American Co. and
American Water 'Works and 'Electric Co., Inc., 299 U. S. 248 (1936).
Here, the Attorney General sought to stay proceedings of a number of

suits brought by public utility holding companies in the courts of the
District of Columbia, challenging the validity of the Securities and
Exchange Act, until the question was decided in the Electric Bond and
Share Company Case, then pending in the federal district court in
the second circuit. The Attorney General declared that he would not
enforce the provisions of the act until the Supreme Court had passed
on the validity of the S. E. C. Act in the Electric Bond case. The
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granted the stay, the Court
of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, holding, however, that the trial court had gone too far in the
granting of the stay. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.
510, 536-7 (1925).
'Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1937).
21 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
21 Subsections (a) and (b) of Sec. 4 provides:
(a) The jurisdiction of the court shall extend to those cases
hereinafter enumerated in subsection (d) hereof in which there is
a dispute between the administrative authority and an individual
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of wrongs. Indirectly, the bill would eliminate suits in equity
to enjoin governmental action, insofar as it provides an adequate
remedy at law to determine the validity of administrative orders.
(B)

Statutory Review

The above difficulties encountered in suits against government officers, whether in law or in equity, are obviated when
there is express statutory authority to bring action. With the
1906 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, 25 provision
was made for suits to enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. With the extension of governmental activity and
the establishment of new agencies, Congress has by statute provided for direct judicial review of governmental action. These
provisions came about from time to time, with reference to specific agencies, but without any effort to systematize the entire procedure of judicial review and enforcement. At present, most
agencies act without being subject to statutory judicial review. 26
Some agencies are subject to review by the ordinary district
courts ;27 others by specially constituted district courts;28 still
or individuals, or between the administrative authority and a
corporation or corporations, but it shall not extend to cases when
there is a dispute between individuals or private corporations, or
between an individual or individuals and a private corporation or
corporations, arising out of administrative action.
(b) Preliminary to any right to a review on appeal by this
court of any administrative decision or any order of an administrative authority or tribunal(1) the order or decision appealed from must have become
a final order or decision of the authority or tribunal issuing
or promulgating it.
(2) the parties affected by such order or decision must
have had notice and an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence including the testimony of witnesses at a hearing.
(3) there must be a record of the proceedings before such
authority or tribunal.
(4) there must be a statutory right either to a review of
such final order or decision by a United States court or to
proceed de novo before a United States court.
34 Stat. 592.
2OSee Blachly, Frederick F. "Working Papers on Administrative
Adjudication" (1938). Government Printing Office. Printed for the
use of the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the hearings
on S. 3676, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess.
17For example, the orders of the deputy Commissioners under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424,
33 U. S. C. 901.
21For example, the rate orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U. S. C. 43, 44, 45, 45a, 48.
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others by special courts ;29 in some instances by appellate courts
acting in an administrative capacity ;30 and still others by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 1
Since the primary purpose of the Logan Bill is to simplify
and systematize judicial review over administrative action, it
would be interesting if we could analyze the present situation in
respect of some 125 agencies 32 of the Federal Government. That,
however, would take us far beyond the scope of the Logan Bill,
which limits review to 16 Federal agencies, and will undoubtedly
include such new agencies as the Civil Aeronautics Authority
whose orders are made subject to review by the Circuit Court
of Appeals.3 3 Our analysis will therefore be limited to these
agencies. In order to save considerable space and to take advantage of a graphic presentation, the statutory provisions for judicial review will not be discussed in detail, but the reader will be
referred to a chart, submitted at the Hearings before the Senate
34
Judiciary Committee, and reproduced on the opposite page.
Complicated as this chart is, it does not completely show the
actual situation. If the authors had attempted to show all the
variations of judicial review as reflected in the statutes and
decisions, relating to the sixteen administrative agencies, they
would have felt it well nigh impossible to present all the data in
a two-dimensional chart and by means of lines of the same character. The variations might have been represented by lines of
various thicknesses, by solid lines, dotted lines, and lines of
microscopic question marks to indicate, that with all the knowledge we possess, there is still some doubt as to the correctness
of the assertion, but then the chart itself would have been too
complicated to be of use.
I shall attempt to point out only some complications which
could not have been made apparent on the chart and which
-1For example, the appraisals of the Collector of the Port are
reviewed by the Customs Court.
0For example, the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents are
reviewed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
" The orders of the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, National Labor Relations Board and other agencies are
reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
" See note No. 26 supra.
13Sec. 1006 (a) Public No. 706, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess.
"The charts used in this article were introduced at the hearings
of the Senate Judiciary Committee by Mr. J. Emmet Sebree of the
Board of Tax Appeals, and had been prepared by Mr. Sebree and by
Dr. Frederick F. Blachly, of the Brookings Institution of Washington.
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relate to (a) the types of orders subject to review, (b) the reviewing courts, (c) the scope of review, and (d) the problem of conflicts.
(a)

Types of Orders Subject to Review

From the chart it would appear that all orders of the specified administrative agencies are equally subject to judicial review.
The statutory provisions, however, differ materially. The statutes authorizing review of the determination of the Board of Tax
Appeals8 5 and of the Processing Tax Board 30 speak not of orders,
but of decisions; other statutes refer to orders ;37 still others, to
orders or requirements. 38 Differences between orders, requirements, or decisions would be difficult to present graphically.
Nevertheless, the differences are important. When the Board of
Tax Appeals reviews a tax liability determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it does not order the taxpayer to pay
the tax; or, if the decision is in favor of the taxpayer, it does not
prohibit the Commissioner from collecting the tax. The decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals would appear to be more akin to a
39
valuation order of the Interstate Commerce Commission or still
more closely related to a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission that a given carrier is not an interurban electric railway exempt from the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act;40 or to a finding by the Federal Power Commission that a
proposed dam and hydroelectric plant on a stream will affect the
interests of interstate or foreign commerce- 41 The decisions of
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
or the Federal Power Commission do not require anyone to do
or to refrain from doing anything, but merely fix the legal status
and invoke the operation of the statute.
These determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Power Commission are not subject to direct
judicial review, and were not intended to be represented by the
344 Stat. 110; 48 Stat. 926; 26 U. S. C. 641.
13 T49 Stat. 1748. 7 U. S. C. 648.
7 For example, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. 45.
18For example, See Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 220; 28 U. S. C.
45a.
, United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Co., 273 U. S.
299 (1927).
0Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 696 (1938).
41 Carolina Aluminum Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d)
435 (1938).
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lines appearing on the chart. The decisions of the Board of Tax
Appeals and the Processing Tax Board, however, are subject to
review by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and then, through certiorari or certification, by the Supreme Court.
If we apply the same rules of law which prompted the. decisions that the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Federal Power Commission are not subject to review, it
should also follow that the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals
and of the Processing Tax Board are not subject to direct judicial
review. There is a difference, however, which may be said to
justify the distinction. The proceedings before the Board of
Tax Appeals and the Processing Tax Board are adversary as
between the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer.
Upon the redetermination of the tax liability by the Board of Tax
Appeals, a petition for review, filed by the taxpayer in the Circuit Court of Appeals, may be said to be a statutory equivalent
for a suit to enjoin the Commissioner from collecting the tax so
determined; and a petition for review filed by the Commissioner
may be said to be a statutory equivalent for a suit to enforce
42
what he deems to be the tax liability.
Another complication arises out of the differences in the
statutory provisions as to whether only final orders are subject to
review. The National Labor Relations Act 43 provides for review
of any final order of the National Labor Relations Board. This
has been held to preclude injunctive relief by a district court
against an order of a board initiating a proceeding. 44 But a
like result was reached by the Supreme Court in a suit to set
45
aside a similar order of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
46
despite the fact that under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, a review
may be had of any order of the Commission, other than an order
for the payment of money. Statutes like the Federal Trade Commission Act, 47 which provide for review of orders have been
interpreted by the Eighth Circuit, 48 as precluding review of an
d Comp. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner Internal Revenue,
279 U. S. 716, 722-728 (1929).
" 49 Stat. 449; 29 U. S. C. 166, fi.
"Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938).

"United States v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 82 (1917).
"38 Stat. 219; 28 U. S. C. 43.
"38 Stat. 719; 15 U. S. C. 45.

"Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission,
280 F. 45 (1922).

KENTUCKY LAW JOUaNAL

initiating order under the "All Writs Section" of the Judicial
Code. 4 9 Sixteen years later, a different conclusion was reached
by the Third Circuit, 50 but that decision was finally reversed by
the Supreme Court. 51 And the Fourth Circuit held that a provision, authorizing a review of an administrative order, like that
in the Federal Trade Commission Act, precluded review of an
order, which, though final as to that particular administrative
agency, left some further administrative action to be taken by
another administrative agency.5 2 But query: Suppose the
Interstate Commerce Commission should issue a rate order on the
transportation of coal, to take effect upon certain action of the
Bituminous Coal Commission. Would such an order be subject
to review under the Urgent Deficiencies Act before the Coal Commission has acted? The Supreme Court has never expressly
ruled that only final orders of administrative agencies are subject
to review. It is arguable that only final orders are reviewable as
a corollary to the requirement that all administrative remedies
must be exhausted. But then there is still left the question
whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies goes to the
jurisdiction of the court, 53 or merely means that ordinarily it
would be an abuse of judicial discretion for a court to exercise
its power before all administrative remedies have been
54
exhausted.
Another class of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which have been held to be not reviewable under the Urgent
Deficiencies Act are what are known as "negative orders", that
is, orders which merely deny relief from the operation of the
statute, like the refusal to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 55 Various reasons have been assigned by the
Supreme Court why negative orders are not subject to review
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, but the most persuasive
41

Sec. 262 Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. 377.

*Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 94 F. (2d)

943 (1938).
5 Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S.
375 (1938).
6 Ames-Baldwin-Wyoming Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
73 F. (2d) 489 (1934).
5 Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 (1932).
&Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Prentis, 211 U. S. 210 (1908); see
also Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Fr. R. R. Co., 278 U. S. 228 (1929).
55Piedmont & Northern R. R. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469
(1930).
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reason appears as a dictum in the Chicago Junction Case,5 6 where
Justice Brandeis pointed out that in order to enter an effective
judicial review in such negative order cases, it would be necessary
for the courts to take over the administrative functions of the
Commission. This reasoning was followed in a recent decision
of the Second Circuit, holding that an order of the Federal Power
Commission, denying an application for a merger of two electric
power companies, was not subject to review by the Circuit Court
of Appeals5 7 under section 313 of the Federal Power Act.
So much for the similarity between the non-reviewability of
negative orders under the Urgent Deficiencies Act and under
section 313 of the Federal Power Act. But what about the orders
of the National Labor Relations Board, as to which the act provides that orders granting or denying relief should be subject to
review? It may be argued that the Act contemplates review
only of those orders denying relief which are affirmative in
character. We have had orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which though negative in form, were held to be
affirmative in effect.5 8 If that is so, how are we going to distinguish the above statutes from the provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act, which provides for review of all orders, affirmative
or negative?59
The above are but a few illustrations of the complications in
judicial review from the standpoint of the orders rendered. Let
us now turn to the complications from the standpoint of the
reviewing court.
(b)

The Reviewing Courts

In most instances, the reviewing tribunal is clearly indicated
in the statute. For example, the orders of the Federal Trade
Commission, Federal Power Commission, Securities and
Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board are subject to review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. But in other
instances, the law is not so clear. For example, the -chart makes
- 264 U. S. 258, 264 (1924).
17Newport Electric Corporation v. Federal Power Commission
97 F. (2d) 580 (1938). But more recently the ninth circuit held otherwise. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n (not yet
reported).
"Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914); Alton R. R. v.
United States, 287 U. S. 229 (1932).
0 Sec. 1006, Public No. 706, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess.
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it appear that all general orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission are subject to review by a three-judge court-with
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court; similarly, with the rate
orders under the Packers and 'Stockyards Act, the general orders
of the Federal Communications Commission, the United States
Maritime Commission, etc. But the statutes authorizing review
of these orders, like the provision authorizing suits to enjoin the
enforcement of state statutes,60 merely provide that suit may be
brought in the district courts. It is only when the plaintiff
seeks an interlocutory injunction, that the statute requires a court
of three judges to be convened, from which an appeal may be
taken to the Supreme Court. If, however, no interlocutory
injunction is prayed for, or if originally was prayed for, and
then abandoned, the issues may be determined by a one-judge
district court and an appeal taken to the Circuit Court of
Appeals.61 There is one dictum in the Supreme Court which
would lend comfort to the view that all general orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission are subject to review by a
three-judge court. 62 Be that as it may, the chart gives no indication of any distinction as to when these orders may be reviewed
by a one-judge court and when by a three-judge court.
In the above discussion concerning the non-reviewability of
negative orders, I have stressed the point that such orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission were not subject to review
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, and that the orders of the
Federal Power Commission were not subject to review under
section 313 of the Federal Power Act. Does that mean that negative orders are not subject to review at all? If they are subject
3
to review, then by what courts? In United States v. Griins,
it was held that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
denying an increase in pay for the transportation of mail was a
negative order, not subject to review under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, but that suit might be brought for just compensation
in the Court of Claims. Would the suit proceed entirely de 'novo
or would the determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission play a part in the proceedings in the Court of Claims? If
the record made before the Interstate Commerce Commission is
Sec. 266 Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. 380.
Ex Parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168, 172 (1929); Stratton v. St. Louis
So. West. Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 15 (1930).

nPowell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 284 (1937).
302 U. S. 226, 234, 238 (1938).
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introduced in evidence, then there is an instance where the Court
of Claims may review an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Something should be said about the final review by the
Supreme Court. 'No distinction appears on the chart between
appeals from interlocutory and final decrees of the three-judge
courts. Yet, as a basis for appeal from an interlocutory degree,
it must be shown that the district court has abused its discretion
in granting or denying relief, and without such showing, the
64
Supreme Court will not go into the merits of the case.
In all instances where the petition for review is filed in the
Circuit Court of Appeals, the chart indicates, the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
on certiorari or certification. Most statutes make such provision,
but some, for example, the Federal Trade Commission Act, provide only for certiorari. 65 There has never been an instance
where the Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the
Supreme Court in a case arising under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Perhaps it may do so under Section 239 of the
Judicial Code. But if we apply the maxim of incluio unius
exclusio alterius, it may equally be argued that certiorari is the
only remedy.
There is no indication on the chart that an appeal may lie to
the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court of Appeals. If, however, a decision or order of an administrative agency is sustained
or set aside because the Circuit Court of Appeals deems a state
statute in violation of the Federal Constitution, then the case
may proceed to the Supreme Court on appeal. 66
(c)

Scope of Judicial Review

Having discussed the complexities in judicial review from
the standpoint of the types of orders and of the reviewing
courts, ]et us turn to the scope of review, which the courts
exercise. There are differences in the statutory provisions as to
the scope of review. Some differences are obliterated through
judicial decisions, but others are created by judicial decisions,
though they do not appear in the statutes.
"Rule 12 of Revised Rules of Supreme Court. See note in United
States Code Annotated, 1938 Supplement; also Alabama v. United
States, 279 U. S. 229 (1929).
38 Stat. 719; 15 U. S. C. 45.
"43 Stat. 939, 28 U. S. C. 348.
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The statutes are not uniform concerning the weight which
may be attributed to the administrative findings as to facts. For
example, neither the Interstate Commerce Act nor the statutes
providing for review of the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals
or of the Processing Tax Board contains any provision as to the
conclusiveness of their findings as to facts. On the other hand, the
Federal Trade Commission Act 67 and the Clayton Act6 8 provide
that the findings of their administering agencies, if supported
by testimony, shall be conclusive. Other statutes provide that
the findings of the administrative agencies as to facts shall be
conclusive, if supported by substantialevidence, 9 and still others
that the findings shall be conclusive, if supported by the wveight
70
of evidence.
Some of the differences disappear when we consider the law
as reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court. Although, as
has been indicated, there is no provision as to the conclusiveness
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's findings, the Supreme
Court has promulgated the rule that those findings will be
regarded as conclusive, if supported by evidence or by substantial evidence.7' Although there is no provision on the conclusiveness of the findings as to the Board of Tax Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the Board's findings as to facts, if
supported by substantial evidence, must be accepted as conclusive and that it is not permissible for the Circuit Court of
Appeals to make findings of its own 72 The same rule has been
applied to findings made by the Federal Trade Commission
and other agencies.

67See Note No. 37, supra.
6138 Stat. 730; 15 U. S. C. 21.
' For example, See National Labor Relations Act, Securities and
Exchange Act, Federal Power Act, etc.
"For example, the findings of the Commodities Exchange Commission, 7 U. S. C. 8, 42 Stat. 1001.
U See Sharfman, I. L.: The Interstate Commerce Commission,
Part II, pp. 385 et seq. The Supreme Court has gone to the extent of
holding that the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission will
be regarded as conclusive, if supported by "more than a scintilla of
evidence". See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central
R. R. 215 U. S.452, 470 (1910). The more recent cases, however, tend
toward the proposition that the findings of the I. C. C. will be regarded
as conclusive, if supported by "substantial" evidence. I. C. C. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 91 (1913); Florida East Coast
Line v. United States, 234 U. S.167 (1914).
71Helvering v. Rankin, 294 U. S. 700 (1935); General Utilities &
Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S.200, 206 (1935); Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 300 U. S.37 (1937).
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Thus by judicial decisions, the general rule applicable to all
of these administrative agencies has practically obliterated the
differences contained in the statutes. The decisions have, however, created differences of their own. Whatever may be said of
the general rule concerning the conclusiveness of administrative
findings, there is no doubt that while the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission are uniformly regarded as conelusive, if supported by evidence, the same uniform treatment
has not been accorded the findings of the Federal Trade Commission.7 3
Still other differences have been introduced through judicial
decisions in connection with the rule that, while the courts will
not review the Commission's findings as to facts and will not substitute their judgments for those of the Commission, the courts
will review their conclusions of law, and will exercise the same
review over mixed questions of law and fact. And so the question often arises when is a fact a fact, when is it a question of
law, and when is it a mixed question of law and fact? A finding
by the Interstate Commerce Commission that a carrier is not an
interurban electric railroad, exempt from the provisions of the
74
Railway Labor Act, has been treated as a determination of fact.
But a finding by the Board of Tax Appeals, that a certain distribution of money made by a corporation to former employees constituted payments for past services rather than gifts, was treated
by the Supreme Court as a mixed question of law and fact. 75
The determination of reasonable rates, or the discriminating
character of practices, being a question of fact, has been held by
the Supreme Court to be entirely within the province of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.76 But in passing on the question of what constitutes "unfair competition" within the mean' International Shoe Machinery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
280 U. S. 291, 303 et seq. (1930), where Justice Stone, in his dissenting
opinion, pointed out that the Supreme Court weighed the evidence and
substituted its own findings of fact for that of the Federal Trade Commission. See also the "doubting opinion" of Chief Justice Taft in
Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 582
(1923).
' Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 596 (1938).
SBogardus v. Commissioner Internal Revenue, 302 U. S. 34, 58
S. C. 61. I. C. C. v. Delaware Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 220
U. S. 235, 251, 255 (1911).
" Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn, 215 U. S. 481, 493-5 (1910).
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ing of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Court held this
was primarily one for the courts 77 to determine.
(d)

Conflict of Decisions
The above complications were comparatively easy to demonstrate, because they can be detected by comparisons of statutes
or by reference to specific cases. With review being exercised
by some 85 district courts and 11 circuit courts of appeal, many
conflicting decisions on the same problems of law are bound to
arise, especially if there is an insufficient uniformity of approach
toward review over administrative action. These conflicts
hamper the work of the administrative agencies and, in addition,
impose undue burdens on the litigants.
It is true, that where there is a conflict between two circuits
as to the same subject matter, the Supreme Court will grant a
writ of certiorari in order to resolve the conflict.7 8 But the concept of a "conflict" in this respect is much too narrow for the
purpose of effecting uniformity in the broad field of administrative law. The conflict of decisions among circuits, furnishing a
ground for the grant of a writ of certiorari, refers to specific
cases, and while there may be a conflict in the applications of the
principles of law, certiorari will be denied, if the cases are distinguishable on the facts.
At times, a direct conflict between two circuits may arise
simultaneously, but again, it may not arise for many years. In
the meantime, the decision of one circuit is not authoritative in
another. Cases continue to be brought to the Circuit Court of
Appeals with the hope that a clear conflict might result.
When that happens, the Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari. The writ, however, is not granted to all aggrieved parties.
The jurisdiction of the Court does not extend to grant relief to
those who had lost out in previous terms of court. It is only the
last litigant who thus profits by the losses of his predecessors.
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF ADmINISTRATION

ORDERS

So much for the present situation in the methods and results
of reviewing administrative orders. One must not overlook the
problems which center about the enforcement of orders. Review
• Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
"Rule No. 38, U. S. Supreme Court Rules.
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and enforcement are often regarded as separate and distinct.
But they are not, for with few exceptions, judicial enforcement
always involves a review of the administrative order; and where
the enforcement is administrative, it is subject to further judicial
review. For a graphic presentation of the present methods of
enforcement of administrative orders, we may adopt another
chart presented at the Hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, reproduced on the next page.
The reader need not be burdened by stressing further complications on this aspect of the problem except to point out some
of the differences in the statutory provisions.
The enforcement provisions found in the Clayton Act, the
Federal Trade Commission Act (before the recent amendment by
Public No. 447, 75th Cong. 3rd sess.), the National Labor Relations Act, National Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, are really
not enforcement, but review provisions. Under these Acts, if the
person against whom the order is issued does not choose to obey
it, and does not seek to have the order reviewed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the administrative agency, in effect, appeals
against that person. It files its petition and transcript, and the
case proceeds in the same manner, as if the respondent had petitioned for a review. If the court affirms the order of the Commission, it adopts that order as its own. Then, if the respondent
disobeys, the process of enforcement takes place3 9
In statutes like the Federal Power Act, the Securities and
Exchange Act, etc., the procedure for enforcement is by way of
suit in the district court, which holds a trial de novo on the order
issued by the administrative agency. Upon evidence adduced
and arguments presented, the district court renders its decree,
which is subject to appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, whose
judgment may be further reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The enforcement provisions under statutes like the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Communication Act, the Shipping Act of 1916, and the Merchant Marini Act of 1936, do not
permit review of the orders, except on the question whether they
had been regularly made and duly served. Having ascertained
these facts, the only question open to the district court is whether
the respondent has disobeyed the order.
-'Federal Trade Commission v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615 (1928).
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It is interesting to note that during the past two years, the
National Labor Relations Board issued 321 orders; of these 65
orders went to the Circuit Court of Appeals on petitions for
review, while the Board sought the enforcement of 79 orders.
During the past 32 years, after the 1906 amendment of See.
16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, s0 the Interstate Commerce Commission had no occasion to enforce its orders. Before
that time, section 16(12) related to "any lawful order or requirement, which of course, opened for review the question of the
validity of the order. The 1906 amendment related to "any
order" issued by the Commission, other than an order for the
payment of money.
II.

REviEW AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE LOGAN BILL

Before we proceed with a discussion of the changes to be
effected by the Logan Bill, it is well to define further the scope of
the bill. It must be borne in mind, that the bill does not concern
itself with disputes between private persons arising from the
orders of administrative agencies, 8 ' but with controversies as
between the administrative authorities and private persons.
That is the reason why the reparation orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission were not included in the bill, and suits
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act were also excluded, for while suits to set aside an award
made under that act are brought against the Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees Compensation Commission, the real party in interest is the claimant for compensation.
The Logan Bill does not attempt a sweeping change in the
judicial review of all administrative orders. In the process of
unifying and systematizing procedure, it is best to go slowly.
The intention is that if the accomplishments realized by this
legislation are as satisfactory as those attained by the Court of
Claims, the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, then it may be advisable to extend the jurisdiction of
the proposed court to orders and agencies not now covered.
The great immediate advantage of this measure, with reference to the enumerated administrative agencies, lies in the fact
that their orders will be reviewed by one court, rather than by
approximately 100 courts. All administrative agencies are now
34 Stat. 591.
See Note No. 24, supra.
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TE LoGNN BL,
subject to the rules of these numerous courts of general jurisdiction. Naturally, the rules cannot be promulgated with special
reference to administrative agencies, no matter how unique their
problems or how they may differ from those of the general litigant. When all of these cases are concentrated in one tribunal,
however, with similar problems pertaining to all of them, the
rules of that court can best be adapted for most efficient adjudication.
The rules8 2 which the proposed court will adopt are bound
to have a wholesome effect on proceedings by the administrative
agencies themselves. It may be advisable, in this connection,
also, to provide that the court shall have power to make rules
respecting administrative procedure within the agencies, in so
far as that procedure is reflected in the questions for reviews;
for example, rules relating to notice, hearing, the reports of
examiners, and exceptions thereto, arguments before the administrative agencies, the requirements as to findings, and the form
and substance of orders. A court of this character may be able
to effect uniformity in administrative procedure, in so far as such
uniformity is necessary or desirable, and to insure a "fair hearing" to the parties affected. Evidently, this cannot be accomplished by the present numerous courts, with a few cases coming
before each of them every year. The most they can do is to
express an opinion with reference to the particular case under
consideration.83
We shall now see how the aforementioned difficulties and
complications of the present method of review and enforcement
will be remedied by the proposed legislation, although a glance
at the chart on the opposite page, as compared with the foregoing
charts, should suffice.
Sec. 10 of the bill provides:
The court is authorized to adopt rules respecting review of the
orders and decisions coming before it; the filing of a petition for
review, the preparation of the record for review; and the conduct
of proceedings upon review, and the proceedings of the court and
its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of
procedure and practice as the court may prescribe.
1 Compare Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. C. 773,
with In matter of petition of National Labor Relations Board, decided
May 31, 1938, and National Labor Relations Board v. Mackey Radio and
Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938).

K. L. J.-3
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(a)

Types of Orders to be Reviewed.

The types of orders subject to review by the proposed court
are limited to those which are: (1) final; (2) preceded by notice
and opportunity to be heard; (3) there is an administrative
84
record and (4) the statute provides for the right of review.
With these provisions, all differences now existing in the law in
respect of the classes of orders subject to review will be obliterated, except as to the problems, arising out of "negative orders" a
review of which would entail the exercise of administrative functions. Even these orders may be uniformly included by a simple
amendment in the bill to the effect that where no effective judicial
decree may be rendered in reviewing an order or decision of the
administrative authority, but a declaratory judgment may be
properly entered, the party aggrieved by such order or decision
may bring suit in this court under the Declaratory Judgment
Act,8 5 joining as parties defendant all officers of the Government
against whom relief is sought. Upon such suit filed, the Court
may then proceed to determine and declare the rights of the
parties and may exercise the same powers for making its judgment effective as is provided in the Declaratory Judgment Act.
(b)

The Reviewing Court.

The Bill provides" that the proposed court shall consist of
a chief justice and ten associate judges; that each justice shall
See No. 24 supra.
- 48 Stat. 955, 49 Stat. 1027, 28 U. S. C. 400.
1 Sec. 3 of the bill provides:
The court shall be organized by the chief justice as follows:
(a) The chief justice and associate justices may each constitute a division of the court for the purpose of hearing and deciding
appeals coming before the court.
(b) Special divisions, consisting of three or more associate
justices, may from time to time be formed by the chief justice for
the purpose of hearing and deciding appeals when in the judgment
of the chief justice such special division is necessary to effect the
expeditious administration of justice or a hearing by more than
one justice is required by law. The chief justice shall designate
the presiding justice of such division.
(c) The court may from time to time be divided by the chief
justice into sections when in his judgment such division will expedite the administration of justice and permit the handling of
related cases by justices who are expert and experienced in the
subject matter thereof. The justices to constitute each section
shall from time to time be designated by the chief justice with due
regard for their several qualifications by way of learning, experi64
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constitute a division of the court; the court may also be divided
into sections for the handling of related problems by judges who
are expert and experienced therein; and the decision of each
division is made final, except that it may be reviewed by the entire
court.
Several questions were raised with reference to these provisions in the course of the Hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
First: Is a court of eleven judges sufficient to handle the
work of reviewing orders of sixteen or seventeen agencies (if we
include the newly created Civil Aviation Authority) ? In the
course of the hearings, a survey disclosed that during the calendar year 1937, 359 cases were brought from these administrative
agencies to the Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and 57 cases to
the district courts, a total of approximately 420 cases. A court of
eleven judges can undoubtedly handle this work, if we consider
that each justice constitutes a division of the court.
Second: Is it desirable that each justice shall constitute a
separate division to hear and determine appeals from such expert
bodies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities
& Exchange Commission, etc? On this question there seems to
be a difference of opinion.87 The work of the court could unence, and special training for the work of the section to which
they are assigned.
(d) The decision of any division shall be deemed the decision
of the court and shall be final unless, within thirty days from the
date the decision is entered, the party of record adversely affected
by the judgment, files a petition for a review of such decision by
the whole court.
(e) The decision of any division of the court shall be reviewed
by the court whenever, in the opinion of the chief justice, such
review Is necessary, or upon the written request of any associate
justice.
"In my appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I suggested that each division shall consist of three judges and that the following amendments be incorporated in the bill:
(1) That to Sec. 16 of the Bill (See Note 92 infra) be added:
"In such case, the proceedings may be had before a single justice
and shall be reduced to writing, but the Chief Justice shall designate two additionaljustices to participatein the considerationand
decision of the case."
(2) That subdivision (d) of Sec. 2 be eliminated. At present
Sec. 2 of the Bill reads as follows:
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doubtedly be more expeditiously handled, if the 420 cases were
divided among 11 judges, and the work of each judge reviewed
in chambers or in conference. On the other hand, there is great
profit to be derived from the joint consideration of each case by
three judges.
The question then arises whether the Court, acting in panels
of three, could adequately handle over 400 cases per year, which
would mean approximately four panels, each handling about 150
In addition to the duties of an associate justice of thp
court, the chief justice shall have powers and duties as follows:
(a) He shall preside over all sessions of the entire
court.
(b) He shall preside at any hearing or other proceeding before the court or before any division thereof in
which he shall participate, unless he shall otherwise direct.
(c) In case of inability to attend any session of the
entire court, he shall designate an associate judge to preside over that session.
(d) He shall have power to divide the court into divisions and shall assign to each division such duties as he
may deem necessary and proper. Where a division consists of three or more associate justices he shall designate
the presiding justice.
(3) Sec. 3 of the Bill (see note No. 86 supra) be amended to
read as follows:
The Court shall be organized by the Chief Justice as
follows:
(a) Any three associate justices, or the Chief Justice
and any two associate justices, may constitute a division
of the court for the purpose of hearing and deciding appeals
coming before the court. The Chief Justice shall designate
the presiding justices of the various divisions.
(b) The court may from time to time be divided by
the Chief Justice into sections when in his judgment such
division will expedite the administration of justice and
permit the handling of related cases by justices who are
expert and experienced in the subject matter thereof. The
Justices to constitute each section shall from time to time
be designated by the Chief Justice with due regardfor their
several qualifications by way of learning, experience and
special training for the work of the section which they are
assigned.
(c) The decision of any division shall be deemed the
decision of the Court and shall be final. Any party of
record aggrieved by a decision of a division may, within
thirty days from the date the judgment is entered, petition
for a rehearing of the case by the entire Court. A rehearing by the entire court shall be granted as of right, if the
decision of the division was not unanimous and a certificate of importanceis issued by the presiding justice of the
division. In other cases, the Court may in its discretion
grant a rehearing by the entire court. Seven justices shall
constitute a quorum of the entire Court.
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cases. This may be compared with the work of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, in which, during the fiscal year 1936, the average
number of cases decided per panel was 235.88 Yet, one must not
forget that the Circuit Courts of Appeal are courts of general
jurisdiction, where a case involving administrative law may be
preceded or followed by one of contract or tort; a tax case may
be followed by one in bankruptcy; a question of common law by
one of statutory construction; etc. This great diversity of problems is bound to have a retarding effect on the efficiency and
thoroughness of adjudication.
The work of the proposed court would be more specialized
and related, and therefore a comparison with the Circuit Court
of Appeals is not quite exact. A comparison may well be made
with the Court of Claims, which, acting as a single court, disposed of over 470 cases in one year.8 9 In other words, each
panel of the proposed court would be required to handle only one
third as many cases as are decided by the Court of Claims. If it
is said, that despite this difference it may not be possible for the
proposed court to handle as many cases because they are far more
complicated than those arising in the Court of Claims, we may
point to a counterbalancing element in the fact that the new
court will be divided into sections, along lines of specialization.
During the calendar year 1937, 243 cases went to the Circuit
Court of Appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals. During the
same period the Board, with 16 members, disposed of 5,043 cases,
or approximately 315 cases per member. At this rate, with
judges expert and experienced in tax law, it should not be necessary to have more than three judges in the section handling
internal revenue cases, leaving eight judges for one half of the
cases not as closely related.
Whether acting in divisions of one or three, it seems reasonable to assume that eleven judges will be able to handle the work
of the proposed court. Nor would eleven judges be too many.
In the beginning, the great task of the court will be to unify and
systematize our body of administrative law, and all the time and
effort of the judges will be required to that end. As we approach
that goal, it may be expected that the amount of litigation will
diminish, or many cases be disposed of with less effort. In the
meantime, however, we must look for an increase of new admin9 See note No. 7, supra.
89See note No. 7, supra.

IKENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

istrative problems from the new agencies, which are likely to be
established. If the court's efficiency will materially diminish
its work; its jurisdiction can be expanded by Congress to cover
agencies not now included in the bill. If Congress does not take
such steps, and the Work of the court continues to diminish, the
Chief Justice of the United States may, under Sections 13, 15, 17
and 18 of the Judicial Code, assign the justices of this court to
other courts, and thus alleviate the pressure of work in those
tribunals. 90
Third: A question has been raised as to the desirability of
a court consisting of experts. It was argued before the Judiciary
Committee that while it is desirable for administrative agencies
themselves to consist of experts, the judges of a reviewing court
should be men well grounded in the law. But the bill does not
preclude the appointment of judges learned in the law, by any
means. On the contrary, it is the purpose of the bill that the
judges appointed by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, would have qualifications at least the equivalent
of the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and in addition,
be expert in some field of public law. The choice, therefore, is
not as between those who are expert in one field and those who
have a broad view of the law, but as between the latter and those
who, in addition, are experts in administrative problems.
If we look upon the law as a set of legal propositions divorced
from the facts, then there is good reason for the contention that,
while administrative agencies should consist of men "appointed
by law and informed by experience", the reviewing court should
be trained in the application of intricate and abstruse mechanical
rules of law. But where the law is interwoven with the facts,
where the task of the judge is to determine whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore what would constitute substantial evidence in an intricate
case; when a reviewing court is confronted with the task pf
determining whether a finding supports an order, which necessitates consideration of the facts in the field of regulation; where
it becomes necessary to interpret statutory provisions with reference to the facts relating to the operation of railroads, power
developments, trade regulation, labor relations, taxation of business, etc., it is far better to have judges who are well acquainted
- 28 U. S. C. 17, 19, 22.
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with those facts than judges who would dispose of such facts
"in an intellectual vacuum. "91
No doubt, experts do develop their "pet" theories and often
disagree. Our legal professional experience, however, is not a
criterion for the extent of disagreement among experts, if we
gauge that disagreement by what they say on the -witness stand.
There they are paid to disagree. Ordinarily their disagreements
do not run the gamut of all the facts in their field of special:
ization. When they disagree, they do so with reference to some
abstruse point beyond the ken of the layman. If their disagreement is merely a matter of difference in testimony as to ordinary
facts, it is important that the judge be well acquainted with the
facts in order to resolve their conflict; but if their disagreement
is a genuine conflict of experts, then a still greater expert is
needed, rather than a judge who might as well flip a coin to
determine who is right. There is no virtue in the proposition
that where two experts disagree, their differences may be resolved
by one who is not sufficiently informed.
Fourth: There seems to be some objection to the proposed
court on the ground that this is a step towards the "centralization" of justice. The argument advanced is that this would
impose a greater burden on the poor litigants than if they could
appeal to the district court within their own state or the circuit
court of appeals within their circuit. The importance of this
argument is exaggerated. The number of poor litigants who
seek reviews of the orders of administrative authorities are few
indeed, and the location of the court often has no relation to the
expense involved. A petition for review may be filed in the
Ninth Circuit, with counsel for the private party located in New
York, or in the Second Circuit when counsel for the private
party is in Minnesota.
But the argument is answered by the provision that the proposed court shall be ambulatory. 92 Any party desiring to have
the ease heard in the field may have that privilege. Each justice,
- 301 U. S. 1, 41 (1937).

0 Section 16 of the bill provides:
The court shall be located in the District of Columbia, where
its general sessions shall be held: but whenever, in the opinion of
the chief justice, the convenience of the public or of the parties
may be promoted or delay or expense prevented thereby, a division
of the court may hold special sessions in any part of the United
States.
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constituting a division of the court, may be periodically assigned
to hear a number of cases in the field. Then, after the hearing,
he can return to the home base to write his opinions. If such
division is to consist of three judges, provision may be made
whereby only the presiding judge of the division will go into the
field, hear oral argument, which may be recorded verbatim, and
then upon his return to Washington, the case may be considered
and decided by him, together with the two other judges of the
division. 93
The argument against "centralization of justice", however,
has another aspect to it. It is said that in a vast land like ours,
with such different prevailing conditions, the law should be
applied by judges who are acquainted with local conditions in
the respective communities. This is an argument which is very
sound as applied to local problems, especially, those arising under
the common law. To take some simple illustrations: A personal injury, caused by an elephant, may have different legal
consequences in India than in the United States; trespass committed by cattle may have different legal consequences in the
rural communities of the western states than in the thickly settled
eastern states, etc. But here we are dealing with federal administration, which ordinarily implies a uniform application of laws
throughout the United States. If Congress intends a law to
have a different application in one locality than in another, it
should so provide in the statute. For example, in the Wages and
Hours Law 94 Congress could have made provision for wage differentials as between the North and South. Without such provision, however, it is neither for the administrative agency nor
the courts to give different applications to the law in the different localities. Both are bound by the law, and it makes little
difference vhether, in applying a law of nationwide scope, the
judge hails from one locality or another.
If the application of the law depends upon facts varying in
different localities, the existence of those facts must be reflected
in the record made before the administrative agency. The
parties before the agencies will no doubt bring forth all the pertinent facts which have a bearing on the matter for decision. If
the facts peculiar to a locality do not appear in the record, it is
"0For this reason, I suggested that Sec. 16 be amended as indicated
in Note No. 87 supra.
P The Wages and Hours Act, Public No. 718, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess.
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not permissible for the judge to substitute his own knowledge,
judgment, and experience for the record in the case. This is so
under existing law and under the Logan Bill.
If the facts peculiar to the locality do appear in the record,
and the administrative agency has given effect to them, then the
peculiar knowledge of the judge concerning those facts plays no
part in the adjudication. If, on the other hand, the administrative agency after considering those facts, finds that they are not
sufficient to disturb the general rule, and the function of the
court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the findings, order, or decision, the acquaintance of the
judge with local conditions plays no part in the determination
of the question. It can conceivably play a part, if the function
of the court is to weigh the evidence in order to ascertain whether
the administrative agency arrived at the correct conclusion. But
that also is not permissible under existing law.
(c) Scope of Review.
We now come to the question of the scope of review to be
exercised by the proposed court. We have seen the complications which arise on account of the many and diverse statutory
provisions and in the applications of those provisions by the
courts. The Logan Bill does away with all the statutory differences. The review is limited to questions of law, and the findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are made conelusive. 95 If, however, it becomes apparent that the application
of the law depends upon additional facts not made of record, and
there was reasonable ground for the failure to adduce those facts,
the court may remand a case to the administrative authority for
further proceedings. 96

1 Section

11 of the Bill provides:
The review by the court shall be limited to questions of law,
and findings of fact of the commission, administrative authority, or
tribunal, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.
Section 12 of the Bill provides:
If either party shall apply to the court to adduce additional
evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such
additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for failure to adduce such evidence at the hearing of the
cause, the court may order additional evidence to be taken before
the tribunal or authority and the tribunal or authority may modify
its findings as to facts by reason of the additional evidence, and it
shall file such modified new findings which if supported by evidence shall be conclusive, and it may file its recommendations for
the modifying or setting aside of the original order or decision.
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These provisions will bear further comment. The Logan
Bill takes seriously the proposition that it is the primary function of a court to apply the law upon the facts presented.
Whether those facts are presented through a trial in court, or
through a stipulation of the parties, or through a determination
of another tribunal, is only incidental to the primary function of
the court. No limitations are imposed on this function, except
that it is limited to a review of those objections which had been
raised before the administrative agency. 97 This is a sound corollary of the requirement that all administrative remedies must be
exhausted before resort may be had to the courts.
Congress has recognized this requirement in some statutes,
even to the extent of requiring that application for rehearing
be filed before an administrative agency, as a condition precedent
to a petition for review by the courts, and provided that the
review shall be limited to the questions raised in the application
for rehearing. 98 In many instances, without statutory provision,
it is the practice to file a petition for rehearing and to limit the
application for review to those questions. But in most instances
there is no well-defined limit to the scope of review which may be
exercised by the courts, either on the questions of fact or questions of, law.
91Section 5 of the Bill provides:
(a) The decisions and orders of the commissions, administrative tribunals, and authorities designated in section 5 may be
reviewed by the court if a petition for such review, Vraying that
such decision or order be reviewed, set aside, or modified in whole
or in part is filed with the clerk of the court by either party within
sixty days after the decision or order is promulgated or Issued.
(b) No objection to an order or decision shall be considered
by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before
the commission, tribunal, or authority issuing the decision or order
from which the appeal is taken.
(c) Upon filing a petition for review, a copy of such petition
shall be forthwith served by the petitioner upon the Commission,
tribunal or authority issuing the order or decision, and the commission, tribunal, or authority shall certify and file with the court
a-transcriptof the record upon which the order or decision complained of was entered. The transcript shall contain the notice or
petition, the pertinent pleadings, if any, the relevant evidence, the
findings of fact, and the order or decision appealed from.
(d) Upon such review the court shall have power to affirm or
if the decision or order of the tribunal,commission or authority Is
not in accordance with the law, to modify or reverse, such decision
or order with or without remanding the case for a rehearing as
justice may require.
"Section 313 Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 860, 16 U. S. C. 8251.
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As to the review on the facts, the Logan Bill adopts the generally accepted rule that the findings shall be conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence, but does not favor one administrative authority over another. Some who appeared in opposition to the bill seemed to regard this rule with disfavor. The
horror sometimes expressed about conclusiveness of administrative findings would suggest that this rule originated with Congress. As a matter of fact, Congress was not the originator of
the rule that administrative findings shall be conclusive. It
originated with the Supreme Court in the following manner.
Prior to 1906, section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act 99
made all findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission prima
facie evidence. In reviewing the Commission's findings, the
courts have followed this rule in reparation cases, but gave
greater weight to the Commission's findings in rate making
cases. The reason for this difference lay in the fact that in the
former class of cases, the courts merely followed the procedure
laid down by Congress, while in the latter, there was the additional factor that the Commission was acting in a quasi-legislative
capacity. In reviewing these findings, therefore, the courts had
to guard against exceeding their judicial powers and taking over
a legislative function. Then Section 16 of the Act was
amended.10 0 Congress made the Commission's findings as to
facts in reparation cases prima facie evidence, and nothing at all
was prescribed concerning the weight to be attributed to the Commission's findings in other types of cases. The course of Judicial
decisions, after the amendment of Section 16 has established the
rule that the Commission's quasi-legislative findings shall be
conclusive.'
The next step was the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act, where the findings of the Commission acting in both
a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial capacity were made conclusive, if supported by testimony. Since then, many statutes
were enacted in which administrative findings were made conclusive if "supported by evidence", or "supported by substan"24 Stat. 384, 25 Stat. 859.
10 34 Stat. 590.
20Hankin, Gregory: Conclusiveness of Federal Trade Commission's Findings as to Facts, 23 Mich. L. Rev., 233, 837; McFarland,

Carl: Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect Thereon
of Constitutional Limitations, p. 3; Sharfman, Interstate Cemmerce
Commission, Part II, p. 385.
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tial evidence." If the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, in
respect of the quasi-legislative findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission is taken as the criterion of the proper weight
attributable to such findings of administrative agencies in general, then such phases as "if supported by evidence" or "supported by substantial evidence" must be regarded as words of
limitation, rather than words expanding the powers of administrative agencies.
In the course of the past twenty years, however, the difference between the weight attributable to quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial findings has vanished, because the findings of the
Board of Tax Appeals, though judicial in character, have been
held to be conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence,
though without any statutory provisions to that effect.
Whether administrative findings are quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial, there is no reason why a reviewing court should
re-try facts, thus determined, any more than facts determined
by a trial court. On the contrary, there is less reason for it.
The administrative findings are determined by men expert and
specialized in the intricate problems, which come before their
respective tribunals. No great principle is served by having
those facts redetermined by a jury or a court, which does not
possess that expert knowledge. If the real reason for the opposition to the finality of administrative findings goes to the accuracy
of the findings, then the remedy lies in an appeal to the appointive power of the President and the Senate, rather than in the
abandonment of the wholesome rule that facts determined by a
specialized and expert tribunal should not be retried by a reviewing court.
(d)

Conflict of Decisions.

With an appeal to one court, rather than approximately one
hundred courts, the probabilities of conflicts are bound to be
reduced to a nullity. But we may expect much more than the
mere elimination of conflicts limited to cases with the same class
of facts. When we speak of conflicts we mean, for example,
different decisions relating to the same section of the internal
revenue laws with a practically identical state of facts. It would
be too much to insist on a uniformity of principles, rules, standards and conceptions in the development of the entire body of
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administrative law. This is possible only if their formulation is
within the control of a single tribunal.
There will undoubtedly be differences of opinion among the
justices themselves, and conflicts may even arise among
the divisions of the court, but those conflicts, if it is to be
expected, will be eliminated through a review by the entire court.
The bill provides that petitions may be filed for review of a decision of a division by the entire court, and such review must be
granted, if the chief justice deems it necessary, or upon the
written request of any associate justice. If the divisions are to
consist of three justices, some provision may be made whereby
in cases of importance, a review may be had by the entire court
hearing the case.' 0 2 In this manner, there is no reason why conflicts should persist in the court's own decisions.
Judicial Enforcement of Orders.
We shall now turn to the civil enforcement of the orders and
decisions of administrative authorities. We have pointed out
the difference between the enforcement of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and those of the other agencies.
The Logan Bill vests jurisdiction in the district courts to enforce
administrative orders, in the same manner as is now provided
with reference to the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.' 0 3 The jurisdiction might as well have been vested in the
See note No. 87 supra.

'

Section 17 of the bill provides:
(a) If any fails or neglects to obey any order of a commission
or administrative authority which may be reviewed on appeal as
provided in this Act, when such order has become final and no stay
of execution has been grauted by the court, and while the same is
in effect, whether a petition for review has been filed or not, the
commission or any party injured thereby, or the United States by
its Attorney General, may apply to the appropriate district court
of the United States for the enforcement of such order. If, after
hearing that court determines that the order was regularly made
and duly served, that it has become final, and that the person is in
disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce obedience to such
order by writ of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or
otherwise, to restrain such person or the officers, agents, or representatives of such person, from further disobedience of such order,
or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to same. And the court
shall assess a fine not to exceed $100 per day for each day such
person fails or neglects to obey such order.
(b) This court shall have the power to enforce its mandates
and orders and nothing in this section shall be construed to diminish
or take away such power.
(c) Definitions-As used in this section, the word "person"
includes a corporation, partnership, or trust.
'
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proposed court without fear of overburdening that court, because
with a provision of this type there will hardly be any cases for
the enforcement of administrative orders.
There is no particular hardship exerted by this type of
enforcement provision. One who questions the validity of any
order has his remedy by way of a review of that order by the
proposed court. If he does not avail himself of this remedy, he
should not have the privilege of flaunting government authorities
until some local judge of another court might hold the order
invalid. The administrative order should become unappealable,
and the only question which should be open to judicial determination is whether the order has been disobeyed.
III. THE

PROBLEm OF EXPENSE.

The work of reviewing the decisions and orders of administrative authorities can thus be handled more expeditiously, efficiently and with greater understanding by the proposed court
than by the one hundred federal courts. 'What is to be gained in
uniformity and efficiency in administrative law would alone be
worth the additional expense involved in setting up this new
tribunal, if indeed this would entail additional expense. It is
true Congress has just made provision for the appointment of
twenty additional federal judges, 0 4 but with the expansion of
federal law, and with the obliteration of state lines in business
relationships, the work of the federal courts is bound to increase.
Even now it is felt that the additional judges are not sufficient to
relieve the pressure of work in those courts.
The Logan Bill would relieve this pressure by taking out of
the courts of general jurisdiction those intricate administrative
problems. A thorough consideration of those cases by a specialized court under the procedure outlined in the Logan Bill would
involve by far less work and less expense than by courts of general jurisdiction.
IV. NEED FOR FURTHER DIScussION.
The Logan Bill, if enacted into law, will have very far reaching consequences, which, in my opinion, will be very desirable.
But that is a subject on which views may differ. It is important
that the legal profession take an active interest in this proposed
3" Public No. 555, 75th Cong.
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legislation. The open minded approach on the part of Senator
Logan is most commendable. Throughout the hearings, he took
the position that the bill is not in final form. He introduced the
bill with the hope that valuable suggestions will flow out of the
interest and discussion by the profession, which might be incorporated in the final draft.
Some of the criticisms and suggestions have been very helpful in clarifying the muddy waters of judicial review over administrative action. Some of these I have attempted to answer.
Others remain to be answered, although they may be regarded as
demurrable complaints, rather than as reasons in opposition to
the bill.
First. One of the complaints is that the bill smacks, too
much of foreign ideas, specifically, the French system of administrative law. Under the French method, the actions of administrative officers are reviewed exclusively by administrative tribunals, not by the judicial courts except to the extent that the
Tribunal of Conflicts, consisting of members of the highest administrative and the highest judicial courts, determines whether a
doubtful case is to proceed in the administrative or in the judicial
system. This criticism is not correct, because the proposed Court
of Appeals for Administration is to be a regular constitutional
court, not exercising any administrative functions. 0 5
Even if the charge were correct, this should not condemn
the bill. The French system of administrative law is the logical
corollary of our own concept of separation of powers which we
borrowed from the French and which we incorporated in our
constitutional system. A dichotomy of tribunals, insuring the
supremacy of each of the three branches of the government
within its own sphere would not be in opposition to but rather in
accord with our constitutional system. But whatever may be
the advantages or disadvantages of the French system, its establishment is not the purpose and effect of the Logan Bill.
Second. Administrative finality is regarded by other critics
' 6
as "administrative absolutism, " 10
and starting with that
'1 See Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933);
United
States v. O'Donoghue, 289 U. S.516 (1933); See also Katz, Wilbur G.:
Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harvard L. Rev., 884, and the distinction
between legislative and constitutional courts, 43 Yale Law Journal, 316.
I" See report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of
the American Bar Association, 61st Annual Meeting, July, 1938.
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hypothesis, they come to the conclusion that all administrative
action must be subject to complete judicial review by courts of
general jurisdiction, to insure a constant safeguard for our
liberties. It may be conceded that at times administrative
agencies have acted, without adhering to the standards of fair
play which attend the procedure in our courts. But this does not
warrant the difference in approach toward the three branches of
the government. The rule of law pronounced by the legislature
or the executive is often deemed "arbitrary, unreasonable,
capricious and oppressive", but if the same rule of law is laid
down by the courts, a different reaction will be evoked. By way
of illustration, one may recall the opinion written some three
years ago by the Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty
League on the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act. From that opinion, it would appear that Congress had
acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive manner. But
when the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act in the
Labor Relations Cases, 107 all doubts concerning the reasonableness of the same rule of law seemed to have vanished.
This difference in approach is not always justified. If disagreement with legislative and executive policy is cause for
designating it as "arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive", the
same epithets may be directed against the judiciary. For example,
if the enactment of the Minimum Wage Law for the District of
Columbia' 08 may be characterized as "an arbitrary exercise of
power", so also must be the recent decision of the Supreme
Court on the Washington State Minimum Wage Law.' 0 9
This difference in approach is sometimes manifested in an
unwarranted assumption, at times aided by the judiciary, that
unless administrative action is subject to judicial review, the
administrative agency is vested with arbitrary powers. 110 The
presumption in favor of reasonableness and regularity of administrative action is cast aside. But in the case of the judiciary, we
never assume that the exercise of power is arbitrary, though there
may be no further review.
Third: One critic was opposed to a special court for special
cases, saying that he would want "strong and cogent reasons, and
1'301 U. S. 1, 49, 58 (1937).
(1923).
108 See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525
'West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
"'0Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 490 (1914).
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clear reasons, for abandoning that basic common law concept of
the supremacy of the law." Senator Logan and all proponents
of this bill would agree with that thought. But what principles
of the common law dictate that specialized cases should not be
adjudicated by specialized courts?
If by the "supremacy of the law" the critic means that the
rule of law, rather than the inclination of the individual administrators or judges, should control, that no governmental action
should depend on the whims of those in authority, but that their
action must find a basis in the provisions of law or their necessary
implications, then an appeal to the proposed court, rather than
the Circuit Court of Appeals or the district court, would not
diminish the supremacy of law.
If the criticism is directed against the proposition that this
court will specialize in cases in which some agency of the government is always the defendant, that it is to be a government court,
then the answer is that all courts of the United States are integral
parts of the Federal Government. Furthermore, the Court of
Claims, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals are likewise courts in which the Government is always
a party. If there is a feeling on the part of counsel for private
persons that these courts decide cases too often in favor of the
Government, there is often a like feeling on the part of counsel
for the Government that the courts lean too heavily in favor of
private litigants. The greatest offender in this respect might
then be the Supreme Court of the United States, because there
the Government wins most of its cases. But we must remember
that the Solicitor General is careful that only meritorious cases
are taken to the highest court.
If the criticism means that review of administrative action
must be attended by all the burdens of common law procedure
and that a trial de wvo be had on all questions of law and fact,
then, in answer, it is sufficient to say that procedure is only an
instrument and not the end of justice. Another writer, equally
opposed to the Logan Bill, pointed out"' that while the Court of
Claims, consisting of five judges and six commissioners, following
the common law procedure, was able to dispose of 473 cases in one
year, the Customs Court, consisting of nine judges, with no comm McGuire, 0. R.: Judicial Review of Administrator Decisions, 26
Georgetown L. Jr., 574.
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missioners, not following the common law procedure, was able to
dispose of 71,492 cases and write approximately 3,500 opinions
during the same year. If he is correct in attributing this
tremendous difference in the efficiency of the courts to the type of
procedure followed, then, procedure should be modified to meet
the need of efficient administration of justice.
The object of the Logan Bill is to unify and systematize
judicial review of governmental action in the midst of our era
of expanding governmental activity. The bill is fully responsive
to the following policy adopted by -theAmerican Bar Association
at its Sixty-first Annual Meeting held in July, 1938:
"There should be unification and simplification of the modes of
judicial review. So far as possible a notice of appeal, specifying
the determination, ruling or order complained of, the grounds of
'objection thereto, and the relief sought, lodged with the commission, tribunal, board or administrative agency in question, and provision for bringing up to the court the record of administrative
action or requiring full disclosure of the nature and details of such
action and the basis thereof and the mode of arriving at any determination involved therein, should suffice."

